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“Only Dust Remains[?]”

1

THE 9/11 MEMORIAL LITIGATION AND THE REACH
OF QUASI-PROPERTY RIGHTS
INTRODUCTION
On September 12, 2011, at a quiet Pennsylvania field
softened from days of rainfall, several families gathered for a
private funeral service to bury three coffins in the ground.2 The
approximately-six-foot steel boxes held not bodies, but the
fragmented and unidentified remains of the passengers from
United Airlines Flight 93 (United 93), one of the airplanes
hijacked by terrorists on 9/11.3 United 93 crashed into this
same field in Shanksville ten years earlier, killing everyone on
board.4 Because the plane plunged into the earth at more than
570 miles per hour, only eight percent of the victims’ remains
were ultimately recovered.5 Nevertheless, partial remains for
each of the forty victims were identified.6 This fact brought
closure to the families, who had reached a consensus regarding
the final resting place of their loved ones’ commingled remains.7
Over the previous ten years, family members had attended
countless memorials for the victims of United 93, but they
could now declare, “This will be our last funeral . . . .”8
Nearly 300 miles away in New York City, the families of
victims of the World Trade Center (WTC) attack lacked similar
closure and accord.9 Unlike at Shanksville, the remains of more
than 1100 victims had yet to be identified.10 For the last ten
1

WTC Families for a Proper Burial, Inc. v. City of New York, 567 F. Supp.
2d 529, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, 359 F. App’x 177 (2d Cir. 2009).
2
See Katharine Q. Seelye, At a 9/11 Site, a “Last Funeral,” N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 10, 2011, at A9.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
See Anemona Hartocollis, An Unsettled Legacy for 9/11 Remains, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 1, 2011, at MB1.
10
See Jo Craven McGinty, As 9/11 Remains Are Identified, Grief Is Renewed,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2011, at A1; see also Seelye, supra note 2, at A9. At the Pentagon,
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years, the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner of New York
City (OCME) has housed the unidentified remains in a
temporary structure adjacent to its Manhattan office building.11
At that site, forensic scientists continue to test the remains for
DNA identification. In 2013, however, New York City (City)
officials plan to transfer the 9000-plus unidentified fragments
to a repository located underneath the National September 11
Memorial and Museum (Memorial).12 There, OCME will have
sole access to the facility to continue DNA testing, except for
family members wishing to visit the site.13 Memorial
administrators claim that the remains repository was
established “[i]n response to overwhelming feedback received
from families,”14 and that it “will provide a dignified and
reverential setting for the remains to repose—temporarily or in
perpetuity—as identifications continue to be made.”15
In the months preceding the tenth anniversary of the
9/11 attacks, the media reported a growing dispute between
some of the victims’ families and City officials concerning the
relocation of the remains to the Memorial repository.16 These
families denounced the planned repository, arguing that they
were neither properly notified nor given the opportunity to
participate in the decision.17 Additionally, they contended that
placing the remains within a museum would be disrespectful to
the memory of the victims.18 In response, Memorial officials
issued a statement summarizing their efforts to reach out to
the WTC families regarding the repository.19 The release noted
five of the 184 victims’ remains also were never identified. See id. All unidentified
remains were buried at Arlington National Cemetery. See id.
11
See Remains Repository at the World Trade Center Site, 9/11 MEMORIAL,
http://www.911memorial.org/remains-repository-world-trade-center-site (last visited
Jan. 16, 2012) [hereinafter Remains Repository].
12
See Hartocollis, supra note 9, at MB1 (outlining how the objecting families,
“appalled by the idea of remains that could belong to their loved ones being turned into
a lure for tourists, want[ed] them kept in a separate above-ground memorial that
would be treated like hallowed ground”).
13
See Remains Repository, supra note 11. The repository “will not be accessible
or visible to the public” and any family member wishing to visit the facility will be
permitted access without having to pay an admission fee to enter the Memorial. Id.
14
Id.
15
Id. (emphasis added).
16
Hartocollis, supra note 9, at MB1.
17
See id.
18
See id.
19
See 9/11 MEMORIAL, SUMMARY OF OUTREACH REGARDING PLANS TO
RELOCATE THE CITY OF NEW YORK’S OFFICE OF CHIEF MEDICAL EXAMINER’S (OCME’S)
REPOSITORY FOR THE UNIDENTIFIED AND UNCLAIMED REMAINS OF 9/11 VICTIMS, available
at http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/97985/memorial-museum-response.pdf (last
visited Oct. 20, 2012) [hereinafter SUMMARY OF OUTREACH].
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that a committee purportedly representing the victims’ families,
and assembled under the aegis of the Lower Manhattan
Development Corporation (LMDC),20 had approved the repository
proposal, and it detailed how, from 2002 to 2006, LMDC sought
input from the families via direct mailings and public forums.21
The dissenting families subsequently requested the
names and addresses of all the victims’ next of kin from the
City in order to poll them about the proposed repository.22 After
the City refused, they filed for injunctive relief in New York
court.23 In Regenhard v. City of New York, the New York County
Supreme Court sided with the City, concluding that releasing
the names and addresses “would constitute an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy.”24 The court explained that the
City had “no obligation to seek the families’ input as to where
the unidentified human remains will be located—they are only
required to disclose the information as to where the remains
will be located.”25 The dissenting families appealed the decision,
which is currently pending.26
Regenhard has significance beyond its seemingly
exiguous purposes. In particular, this preliminary lawsuit
raises a more fundamental and perhaps more difficult question:
who is legally empowered to determine the final disposition of
these unidentified human remains? Like most jurisdictions in
the United States,27 New York has recognized the surviving next
20

In November 2002, LMDC announced that it was creating the Memorial
Mission Statement Drafting Committee in order to “draft a mission statement that will
be used to guide the development” of the WTC Memorial. Press Release, LMDC,
Committees Created to Draft WTC Memorial Mission Statement and Program (Nov.
12, 2002), available at http://www.renewnyc.com/displaynews.aspx?newsid=e3f871881ed5-4193-943b-5fd10befab20. The starting point for the statement would be a
preliminary draft authored by the LMDC Families Advisory Council. Id. LMDC said
that the mission statement would incorporate “extensive public input . . . through
Advisory Councils, public forums in every borough and New Jersey, a questionnaire
sent to relatives of every World Trade Center victim, and thousands of emails sent to
LMDC.” Id.; cf. Families Advisory Council Meeting Minutes, LMDC (Aug. 13, 2002),
available at http://www.renewnyc.com/AboutUs/AdvisoryMeetings.aspx.
21
See SUMMARY OF OUTREACH, supra note 19.
22
See Anemona Hartocollis, Poll of 9/11 Families Is Sought over Unidentified
Remains, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2011), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/02/pollof-911-families-is-sought-over-unidentified-remains/.
23
See Order to Show Cause at 1-2, Regenhard v. City of New York, No.
109548/2011 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 18, 2011).
24
Regenhard, No. 109548/2011, slip op. at 6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 25, 2011).
25
Id. at 7.
26
See Maria Alvarez, 9/11 Families Appeal to Judge on Victims List, NEWSDAY
(Aug. 20, 2012), http://www.newsday.com/long-island/9-11-families-appeal-to-judge-onvictims-list-1.3916407.
27
See, e.g., Fuller v. Marx, 724 F.2d 717, 719 (8th Cir. 1984) (Arkansas law);
Enos v. Snyder, 63 P. 170, 171 (Cal. 1900); Culpepper v. Pearl St. Bldg., Inc., 877 P.2d
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of kin’s right to immediate possession of the deceased’s body for
preservation and burial as a legally protected interest since as
early as 1857.28 Often referred to as a “quasi-property right,”29 or
alternatively as the “right of sepulcher,” this common-law
creation vests something less than full ownership in the next of
kin “to choose and control the burial, cremation, or other final
disposition of a dead human body.”30 Under New York law, the
next of kin has the right to receive the body once the coroner’s
office has concluded its statutorily-authorized investigative
duties.31 However, whether the quasi-property right extends to
unidentified remains possessed by the medical examiner upon
completion of its responsibilities remains unsettled.32
The primary question this note seeks to answer is
whether the New York quasi-property right attaches to the
commingled and yet-to-be-identified remains of WTC victims.
While the answer to this question may appear trivial in light of

877, 880 (Co. 1994); Dunahoo v. Bess, 200 So. 541, 542 (Fla. 1941); Louisville & N. R.
Co. v. Wilson, 51 S.E. 24, 26-27 (Ga. 1905); Beam v. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co.,
97 Ill. App. 24, 28 (App. Ct. 1901); Anderson v. Acheson, 110 N.W. 335, 336 (Iowa
1907); Blanchard v. Brawley, 75 So. 2d 891, 893 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1954); Radomer
Russ-Pol Unterstitzunf Verein v. Posner, 4 A.2d 743, 747 (Md. 1939); Weld v. Walker,
130 Mass. 422, 423 (1881); Doxtator v. Chicago & W.M. Ry. Co., 79 N.W. 922, 922
(Mich. 1899); Larson v. Chase, 50 N.W. 238, 238 (Minn. 1891); Spiegel v. Evergreen
Cemetery, 186 A. 585, 586 (N.J. 1936); Barela v. Hubbell Co., 355 P.2d 133, 136 (N.M.
1960); Gurganious v. Simpson, 197 S.E. 163, 164 (N.C. 1938); Wynkoop v. Wynkoop, 42
Pa. 293, 301 (1862); Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227, 242-43
(1872); Griffith v. Charlotte, Columbia & Augusta R.R., 23 S.C. 25, 32 (1885); Coty v.
Baughman, 210 N.W. 348, 350 (S.D. 1926); Terrill v. Harbin, 376 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1964); Smart v. Moyer (In re Estate of Moyer), 577 P.2d 108, 110 (Utah 1978)
(holding that the right to a decedent’s body “is a property right of a special nature . . .
[but] should [not] be regarded as an absolute property right . . . .”); Nichols v. Cent. Vt.
Ry. Co., 109 A. 905, 907-08 (Vt. 1919); Sanford v. Ware, 60 S.E.2d 10, 13-14 (Va. 1950);
Koerbor v. Patek, 102 N.W. 40, 45-46 (Wis. 1905).
28
See Correa v. Maimonides Med. Ctr., 629 N.Y.S.2d 673, 675 (Sup. Ct. 1995)
(“The law is well settled that the surviving next of kin have a right to the immediate
possession of a decedent’s body for preservation and burial and that damages will be
awarded against any person who unlawfully interferes with that right or improperly
deals with the decedent’s body.”); In re Widening of Beekman St., 4 Brad. Sur. 503, 530,
532 (N.Y. 1857).
29
Pierce, 10 R.I. at 238.
30
Kimberly E. Naguit, Note, Letting the Dead Bury the Dead: Missouri’s Right
of Sepulcher Addresses the Modern Decedent’s Wishes, 75 MO. L. REV. 249, 250 (2010).
31
See Shipley v. City of New York, 908 N.Y.S.2d 425, 427-32 (App. Div. 2010).
32
See, e.g., WTC Families for a Proper Burial, Inc. v. City of New York, 567
F. Supp. 2d 529, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding that “[n]o case has extended . . . a right to
an undifferentiated mass of dirt that may or may not contain undetectable traces of
human remains not identifiable to any particular human being”), aff’d, 359 F. App’x
177 (2d Cir. 2009); Comite en Memoria del Vuelo 587 Inc. v. Hirsch, No. 100382/2005,
slip op. at 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 26, 2005) (noting that no New York State “case, statute,
rule or regulation . . . deals specifically with a situation where human remains are
unable to be identified or are identified in increments”).
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the extraordinary facts of the Memorial case,33 the issue is not
novel. The families of the American Airlines Flight 58734 crash
victims litigated this very issue, but New York law failed to
provide these families with a mechanism to decide how to
dispose of the remains held by OCME.35 The disposition of
unidentified remains also arose in the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina, and one commentator noted the “urgent need
for . . . application and contemplation” of the quasi-property
right in mass-disaster events.36 More recently, newspapers
chronicled how the Dover Air Force Base mortuary disposed of
military service-members’ cremated and unidentifiable remains
by dumping them in landfills.37 DNA testing has “found
increasing use as a means to identify remains after . . . mass
disasters,” and “[s]uccessful identifications have been made in
recent years following aircraft crashes and for misplaced
crematory corpses.”38 Therefore, an analysis of the Memorial
litigation carries implications extending far beyond the unique
facts of the case.
For the time being, OCME has the right to possess the
remains indefinitely while it continues DNA testing. As
33

For purposes of this note, in order to avoid confusion with WTC Families, a
2008 case in S.D.N.Y., I will refer to the current dispute over the relocation of the WTC
victims remains as the “Memorial case” or “Memorial litigation.”
34
Flight 587 crashed into Belle Harbor, Queens on November 12, 2001
shortly after takeoff from John F. Kennedy International Airport, killing all 260
passengers and crew aboard the aircraft as well as five people on the ground. See
Verified Petition at 2-3, Hirsch, No. 100382/2005; see also Amy Z. Mundorff,
Anthropologist-Directed Triage: Three Distinct Mass Fatality Events Involving
Fragmentation of Human Remains, in RECOVERY, ANALYSIS, AND IDENTIFICATION OF
COMMINGLED HUMAN REMAINS 123, 126 (B. Adams & J. Byrd eds., 2008).
35
See Hirsch, No. 100382/2005, slip op. at 3.
36
Sarah Tomkins, Priam’s Lament: The Intersection of Law and Morality in the
Right to Burial and Its Need for Recognition in Post-Katrina New Orleans, 12 UDC/DCSL
L. REV. 93, 94 (2009); see also Laura Maggi, Katrina Dead Interred at New Memorial,
TIMES-PICAYUNE
(Aug.
29,
2008),
http://www.nola.com/news/index.ssf/2008/08/
katrina_dead_interred_at_new_m.html.
37
See Craig Whitlock & Mary Pat Flaherty, Hundreds of Troops’ Ashes Put in
Landfill, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/air-force-dumped-ashes-of-more-troops-in-va-landfill-thanacknowledged/2011/12/07/gIQAT8ybdO_print.html.
38
C.H. Brenner & B.S. Weir, Issues and Strategies in the DNA Identification
of World Trade Center Victims, 63 THEORETICAL POPULATION BIOLOGY 173, 173 (2003)
(citations omitted); see also Dorothy Nelkin & Lori Andrews, Do the Dead Have
Interests? Policy Issues for Research After Life, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 261, 285 (1998)
(describing a California case where “[t]he emotional distress of relatives was also at
issue in . . . a 1991 class action against mortuaries, funeral homes and crematoriums
that had handled as many as 16,000 bodies”). For additional information on the 1991
class action case, see Suit Says UCLA Medical School Illegally Disposed of Bodies, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 1, 1996, at 4, available at http://articles.latimes.com/1996-11-01/local/me60189_1_body-program.
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discussed below, improvements in forensic DNA analysis have
enabled OCME to identify WTC victims in ways that were
impossible ten years ago.39 It is conceivable that OCME will
eventually be able to identify remains for most, and possibly
all, of the WTC victims.40 Nevertheless, thousands of fragments
will likely never be identified. If and when the medical
examiner terminates DNA testing, some entity, individual, or
collection of individuals will have to decide what to do with the
residual remains. As the dispute over the Memorial repository
indicates, the WTC families care deeply about the final
disposition of their loved ones’ remains, and some have been
willing to litigate the issue.
This note contends that in situations like the Memorial
case, where the next of kin claim a quasi-property right over
commingled and unidentified remains, the complex web of New
York common and statutory law relegates the remains to a
state of legal limbo. The next of kin are able to claim or waive
their rights to any remains identified by OCME in the future,
but they cannot assert their quasi-property rights to immediate
possession of these remains until they are affirmatively
identified. At the same time, OCME, which ostensibly
possesses the right to dispose of unidentified human remains,
is unlikely to do so while claims are outstanding. Consequently,
any residual remains will persist as OCME laboratory
specimens in perpetuity, subject of course to further advances
in DNA testing. It certainly appears, as one participant in this
dispute has lamented, that “since unidentified remains
potentially belong to all the families, they belong to none.”41
Though no perfect solution exists, legislators need not
acquiesce to the status quo. New York City law should be
modified to establish standards and procedures to ensure
mandatory repatriation and consultation with the next of kin
when determining how commingled and unidentified remains
should be put to rest. Part I of this note will briefly summarize
recent advances in forensic DNA analysis to demonstrate that,
inevitably, the City will have to grapple with who controls the
WTC residual remains’ final disposition. Part II will evaluate
current New York law governing the disposition of human
remains, concluding that it relegates unidentified remains to a
39

See infra Part I.
See infra Part I.
Chip Colwell-Chanthaphonh & Alice M. Greenwald, “The Disappeared”:
Power over the Dead in the Aftermath of 9/11, 27 ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY, June 2011, at 6.
40
41
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state of legal limbo. Part III will then survey the origins,
underpinnings, and scope of the modern quasi-property right,
concluding that the Memorial case has highlighted the outer
boundary of the right: DNA identification. Finally, this note
recommends that New York City modify its laws governing the
disposition of human remains. Specifically, the City should look
to repatriation of Native American remains under the Native
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act,42 a federal
statute that endeavors to resolve analogous collective disputes
over unidentified human remains.
I.

ADVANCES IN FORENSIC DNA ANALYSIS HAVE IMPROVED
THE PROSPECT OF IDENTIFYING REMAINS FOR MOST OF
THE WORLD TRADE CENTER VICTIMS

On September 11, 2001, 2753 people perished at the
World Trade Center after terrorists flew two commercial jets
into the towers.43 In the aftermath, “the Mayor of New York
City directed [OCME] to do everything humanly possible to
identify every fragment of human remains.”44
Given the unprecedented nature of the WTC disaster
with respect to the volume and condition of the remains,45
forensic DNA analysis constituted the most efficacious means
to identify the victims.46 The vast majority of the victims were
fragmented by the towers’ collapse, which amalgamated body
parts with the steel, concrete, and glass of the destroyed

42

25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (2006).
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF MED. EXAMINER, WORLD TRADE CENTER OPERATIONAL
STATISTICS (last updated Oct. 16, 2012) [hereinafter WTC OPERATIONAL STATISTICS] (on
file with the author). While some sources vary on the total fatalities and other statistics,
this note uses OCME’s official tabulations unless otherwise noted.
44
Glenn R. Schmitt, Introduction to Excerpts from Lessons Learned from
9/11: DNA Identification in Mass Fatality Incidents, 1 S. NEW ENG. ROUNDTABLE
SYMP. L.J. 13, 17 (2006).
45
Leslie G. Biesecker et al., DNA Identifications After the 9/11 World Trade
Center Attack, 310 SCIENCE 1122, 1122 (2005).
46
Robert Shaler & Thomas J. Bode, DNA Identification of the Missing After
the WTC Attacks: A Cooperative Public/Private Effort, FORENSIC MAG., Aug.-Sept.
2011, available at http://www.forensicmag.com/article/dna-identification-missing-afterwtc-attacks-cooperative-publicprivate-effort; see also Brenner & Weir, supra note 38, at
177 (noting that “[i]n most cases little but DNA [could] possibly be used to identify
[WTC victims]”). These predictions proved prescient as 88% of the 999 victims
identified by a “single modality” were identified by DNA. WTC OPERATIONAL
STATISTICS, supra note 43. Nearly “one-third of all the decedents (over half of those
ultimately identified) would not have been identified” but for DNA analysis. James R.
Gill et al., The 9/11 Attacks: The Medicolegal Investigation of the World Trade Center
Fatalities, 6 FORENSIC PATHOLOGY REVS. 181, 186 (2011).
43
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buildings.47 Some victims “disappeared without a trace”48 as
body parts were exposed to 1000°C fires that took over three
months to squelch, leaving them nearly indistinguishable from
inorganic material.49 These problems were compounded by
OCME’s understandable unpreparedness for a disaster of this
magnitude.50 Initial estimates placed the number of potential
victims at 20,000.51 Accordingly, Dr. Charles Hirsch, the Chief
Medical Examiner, made the unprecedented decision “to DNAtest every piece of human remains no matter how small,”
ensuring that no potential victims would be overlooked.52
Expectations that OCME scientists would promptly
identify all WTC victims by DNA testing proved to be
misguided.53 The extreme conditions at the WTC site quickly
deteriorated the quality of DNA profiles, overwhelming
contemporary scientific capabilities.54 Moreover, the remains

47

Biesecker et al., supra note 45, at 1122; Zoran M. Budimlija et al., World
Trade Center Human Identification Project: Experiences with Individual Body
Identification Cases, 44 CROATIAN MED. J. 259, 259 (2003) (cataloguing “the impact of
the aircrafts and abnormally high temperatures due to the fuel explosion, collapse of
the towers, prolonged exposure to different weather conditions, fire and water, as well
as the use of heavy equipment in the recovery effort”); Mitchell M. Holland et al.,
Development of a Quality, High Throughput DNA Analysis Procedure for Skeletal
Samples to Assist with the Identification of Victims from the World Trade Center
Attacks, 44 CROATIAN MED. J. 264, 265 (2003).
48
Brenner & Weir, supra note 38, at 177; see also WTC Families for a Proper
Burial, Inc. v. City of New York, 567 F. Supp. 2d 529, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(“Approximately 1,100 of the victims perished without leaving a trace, utterly
consumed into incorporeality by the intense, raging fires, or pulverized into dust by the
massive tons of collapsing concrete and steel.”).
49
Biesecker et al., supra note 45, at 1122. Moreover, tissue fragments
recovered many months after the collapse had deteriorated due to “bacterial and other
processes . . . .” Id.
50
See Shaler & Bode, supra note 46 (noting that despite its status as the
“largest forensic DNA laboratory in the United States,” the operation “would require
nonexistent resources . . . .”); Biesecker et al., supra note 45, at 1123 (describing how
“OCME recognized that its computers and data communication facilities were
inadequate for this project”).
51
Gill et al., supra note 46, at 183.
52
Mundorff, supra note 34, at 128. The decision was unprecedented because
“[i]vestigators in mass fatality events generally do not DNA-test every fragment . . . .” Id.
53
See David W. Chen, New Test for 9/11 ID’s is Moving Much Slower than
Scientists Hoped, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2002, at B3 (noting how the identification “process
has unfolded far more slowly than anticipated” and OCME had not yet identified remains
for fifty-one percent of the victims in November 2002). In April of 2002, OCME had
identified 968 decedents after examining 19,219 remains and by December 2008, 657
additional victims had been identified. Gill et al., supra note 46, at 186.
54
Shaler & Bode, supra note 46; see also Biesecker et al., supra note 45, at
1122 (noting that the conditions at WTC “made it difficult to isolate and genotype the
DNA from the specimens”); Amy Z. Mundorff et al., DNA Preservation in Skeletal
Elements from the World Trade Center Disaster: Recommendations for Mass Fatality
Management, 54 J. FORENSIC SCIENCE 739, 739 (2009) (describing how “UV radiation,
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consisted of thousands of bone fragments and, according to one
OCME director, a “robust, reliable, and rapid method for extracting
DNA from bones did not exist” in 2001.55 As of this writing, fortyone percent of the victims have yet to be even partially identified.56
OCME currently possesses over 8500 unidentified human
remains57 out of the nearly 22,000 fragments recovered after the
towers’ collapse.58 Recent advances in forensic science, however,
have brought the original forecast closer to fruition.59
Over time and in cooperation with private industry,
OCME has developed the ability to extract viable DNA samples
from bone fragments.60 Ten years later, scientists at OCME
continue the laborious work of evaluating hundreds of remains
per month “in an ongoing attempt to match a name to each
piece of human remains recovered from [the WTC].”61 Whereas
OCME scientists could only evaluate a few fragments per day
ten years ago, improved technology now allows them to analyze
several hundred per month.62 Better techniques for extracting
viable DNA from miniscule and degraded samples led OCME to
generate thirty-two new identifications in the last five years.63
OCME scientists “have utilized these advances to go back and
retest inconclusive fragments every few years, often succeeding
where they had previously failed.”64 The improved technology
has borne fruit. In May and August 2011, OCME successfully
matched DNA for two previously unidentified WTC victims.65

humidity, moisture, heat, fire, and mold . . . contributed to the advanced state of
decomposition of the remains and to the degradation of DNA”).
55
Shaler & Bode, supra note 46.
56
WTC OPERATIONAL STATISTICS, supra note 43.
57
The remains consist of “mainly bone fragments but also tissue that has
been dehydrated for preservation.” Hartocollis, supra note 9.
58
See WTC OPERATIONAL STATISTICS, supra note 43.
59
See N.Y. Univ. Langone Med. Ctr., A Decade Later, the Office of the Chief
Medical Examiner Upholds Its Promise to Identify Every Remnant of the Lives Lost in
the World Trade Center Attacks, NEWS & VIEWS, July-Aug. 2011, at 5 [hereinafter A
Decade Later].
60
Id. at 5; see also Shaler & Bode, supra note 46 (discussing the development
and efficacy of coordination with private companies like Bode Technology Group,
Celera and Orchid Biosciences to develop ever-refined techniques to analyze DNA in
bone fragments).
61
A Decade Later, supra note 59, at 5.
62
Id.
63
Id. For a comprehensive review of the scientific processes utilized in the
WTC identification effort, see generally Mundorff et al., supra note 54; Biesecker et al.,
supra note 45; Holland et al., supra note 47; Budimlija et al., supra note 47.
64
A Decade Later, supra note 59, at 5.
65
See Al Baker, A 9/11 Victim Is Identified by the Medical Examiner, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 23, 2011, 5:53 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/23/a-911-victim-isidentified-by-the-medical-examiner/; Anemona Hartocollis, First New Identification of 9/11
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OCME now identifies remains on a daily basis.66 Thus,
improvements in DNA typing raise the prospect that most, if
not all, WTC victims will be partially identified.67 It now
appears, however, that the original goal of identifying every
single fragment has yielded to a more feasible target:
identifying each victim.68 Indeed, OCME has publicly
committed itself to testing the remains until every victim has
been identified.69 This shift accords with previous mass-disaster
identification efforts, where “the standard of care is to identify
each victim, not each remain.”70
Thus, the families and the City must confront the nearcertain prospect that DNA testing will end without identifying
all of the WTC remains. Consequently, the question arises as to
who should determine the final disposition of any residual
human remains. In Part II, this note examines the existing
legal framework in New York concerning the disposition of
human remains in order to determine which party holds the
power to decide this question.
II.

NEW YORK LAW HAS NOT ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED THE
DISPOSITION OF UNIDENTIFIED REMAINS

In dismissing the Regenhard petition,71 the New York
County Supreme Court wrote that neither the City nor OCME
was obligated “to seek the families’ input as to where the
unidentified remains will be located—they are only required to
disclose the information as to where the remains will be
located.”72 The court, however, cited no statute, regulation, or
Victim Since 2009, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2011, 6:38 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/
2011/05/12/first-new-identification-of-911-victim-since-2009/.
66
McGinty, supra note 10, at A1.
67
A Decade Later, supra note 59, at 5. Dr. Charles Hirsch, Chief Medical
Examiner recently stated: “This process is not time limited . . . . Ten years ago, we
promised the victims’ families that we would never quit working to identify every last
individual who died that day—and we’re going to keep that promise. It’s a sacred
obligation.” Id.
68
See Brenner & Weir, supra note 38, at 177 (concluding that “there is no
prospect of attaining a closed-system” and setting “a plausible upper bound for the
eventual number of [WTC victim] identifications” at 2100).
69
See Gill et al., supra note 46, at 194; Hartocollis, supra note 65; Letter from
Charles S. Hirsch, Chief Medical Examiner (Sept. 21, 2006) (on file with author) (“Recent
advances in the technique for extracting DNA from bone . . . have provided us the
opportunity to renew our efforts to identify your loved ones. We are working actively on
World Trade Center identifications, and new identifications will be forthcoming.”).
70
Budimlija et al., supra note 47.
71
See supra text accompanying notes 23-26.
72
Regenhard v. City of New York, No. 109548/2011, slip op. at 7 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Oct. 25, 2011).
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case to support that assertion.73 In the following sections, this
note will analyze the few laws that exist concerning the
disposition of unidentified remains to determine whether the
Regenhard court was correct.
A.

Statutes and Cases Governing the Disposition of Human
Remains

Both New York State statutes and New York City
municipal ordinances govern the authority and responsibilities
of OCME.74 As one court has noted, “the statutory powers and
discretionary authority of [OCME] are extensive.”75 Pursuant to
the New York City Charter, Chapter 12, section 557 (Section
557), OCME is empowered to “provide forensic and related
testing and analysis . . . in furtherance of investigations
concerning persons both alive and deceased . . . .”76 Moreover,
subdivision 557(f) grants OCME the authority to “perform the
functions of the city mortuary . . . including the removal,
transportation and disposal of unclaimed or unidentified human
remains . . . .”77 Thus, OCME ostensibly holds the legal right to
determine the final disposition of the WTC unidentified remains.
Where human remains are identifiable, the statutory
“person in control of disposition” is entitled to the remains
upon completion of autopsies, DNA testing, or other authorized
analysis.78 Absent testamentary direction by the deceased, New
York Public Health Law (PHL) section 4201 determines the
person in control of disposition.79 It codifies the common-law
order of priority,80 beginning with the surviving spouse and

73

See id.
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4200 (McKinney 2011); N.Y.C. R. & REGS.
§ 205.01 (2011).
75
Shipley v. City of New York, 908 N.Y.S.2d 425, 430 (App. Div. 2010).
76
N.Y.C. CHARTER § 557(f)(3) (Supp. I 2011).
77
Id. § 557(f)(2) (emphasis added).
78
See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4201(2)(a) (delineating “in descending
priority [the persons who] shall have the right to control the disposition of the remains
of such decedent”).
79
Id. § 4201(2).
80
See, e.g., Secord v. Secor, 18 Abb. N. Cas. 78, 81-82 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1870)
(“In the absence of a testamentary direction, is it not better that the husband should
bury the wife, and the wife the husband, than that the door should be opened to an
unseemly contest between the surviving parent and the next of kin?”); Frank W.
Grinnell, Legal Rights in the Remains of the Dead, 17 GREEN BAG 345, 347-52 (1905)
(citing cases explicating the general rule that in the absence of a will, the right to
determine burial falls to the spouse first, and then descending to the children,
grandchildren, parents, and siblings).
74
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devolving to any surviving children, parents, and siblings.81
PHL section 4201 further provides that the “person in control
of disposition . . . shall faithfully carry out the directions of the
decedent to the extent lawful and practicable . . . in a manner
appropriate to the moral and individual beliefs and wishes of
the decedent . . . .”82 Should a dispute arise over the remains’
disposition, the statute dictates that it “shall be resolved by a
court of competent jurisdiction” pursuant to an Article Four
proceeding under the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules.83
A New York appellate court evaluated the interplay
between OCME’s statutory powers and the quasi-property
right84 in Shipley v. City of New York.85 In that case, an OCME
medical examiner, while performing an autopsy, removed and
retained the brain of the plaintiffs’ son and returned the body
without informing the plaintiffs that their son’s brain was still
in his possession.86 The parents sued for damages based on a
quasi-property theory.87 In its defense, OCME contended that
“the common-law right of sepulcher cannot infringe upon
[OCME’s] expansive authority . . . to discharge its duties in the
exercise of its professional discretion.”88
The
court
wrote
that
OCME’s
“statutory
powers[,] . . . [though] extensive[,] . . . [are] not unlimited.”89
The state law governing disposition, autopsy, and dissection of
cadavers, said the court, “reflects [the] concerns for respecting
the corporal remains of decedents and protecting the feelings of
family members by strictly limiting the circumstances under
which autopsies may be performed.”90 Specifically, PHL
section 4215 “safeguards the rights of the next of kin to
receive [the] remains for burial” once the “legitimate purposes
of an autopsy have been satisfied . . . .”91 That is, under the
court’s interpretation, section 4215 “implicitly acknowledges” the
common-law quasi-property right to possess the remains.92 By

81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92

N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4201 (2)(a)(i-v). Cf. N.Y.C. R. & REGS. § 205.01 (2011).
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4201(2)(c).
Id. § 4201(8).
See infra Part III.
908 N.Y.S.2d 425, 429-31 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010).
Id. at 427.
Id.
Id. at 429.
Id. at 430.
Id. (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. The statute at the time read:
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mandating the return of the human remains, the statute
“strikes an appropriate balance between fulfillment of the
legitimate scientific and investigative duties of [OCME] and the
recognition of the long-established rights of next of kin to receive
and provide final repose to the remains of their loved ones.”93
Since the medical examiner in Shipley had no further legitimate
need to retain the decedent’s brain, the court concluded that
plaintiffs had a valid cause of action against OCME.94
Whereas Shipley involved the removal of an identifiable
brain from a corpse, Comite en Memorial del Vuelo 587 Inc. v.
Hirsch concerned a quasi-property action over commingled and
unidentified remains.95 In Hirsch, which preceded Shipley by five
years, the Comite en Memoria del Vuelo 587 Inc. (the
Committee), representing the families of the victims of American
Airlines Flight 587 (Flight 587),96 filed a mandamus action to
compel OCME to bury the victims’ unidentified remains.97
OCME had identified partial remains for all 265 victims but
could not identify 308 residual fragments through DNA testing.98
When the families discovered that OCME intended to inter
these residual remains in a “nondescript common burial
ground,” they objected vociferously. Instead, the families
proposed that OCME bury the unidentified remains in a private
cemetery chosen by the relatives.99
The Committee had held a meeting of family members
representing 100 of the crash victims, who approved by
majority vote a plan to entomb the remains at Trinity
Cemetery in New York City.100 However, several families that
did not participate in the vote objected and submitted a letter
to OCME complaining that the vote was flawed.101 In response,
In all cases in which a dissection has been made, the provisions of this
article, requiring the burial or other lawful disposition of a body of a deceased
person, and the provisions of law providing for the punishment of interference
with or injuries to it, apply equally to the remains of the body after dissection
as soon as the lawful purposes of such dissection have been accomplished.
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4215(1)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
93
Id. at 431.
94
Id. at 427.
95
Comite en Memoria del Vuelo 587 Inc. v. Hirsch, No. 100382/2005, slip op.
at 1, 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 26, 2005).
96
See supra note 34.
97
Hirsch, No. 100382/2005, slip op. at 1.
98
See id. at 2.
99
See Verified Petition, supra note 34, at 3.
100
See id. at 5-6.
101
See id. at 7.
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the medical examiner’s office announced that it would not
release the remains without either unanimous consent from
the surviving next of kin or a court order.102
In its supporting briefs, the Committee stressed that it
was not “seeking custody and control of the unidentified
remains or that they be released to it.”103 Rather, it contended
that OCME, as legal custodian, was required to transfer the
remains to Trinity Cemetery as there was no longer any
investigative reason to withhold the remains.104 OCME, claimed
the Committee, had an “affirmative and non-discretionary
duty,” under PHL section 4200,105 to ensure that the remains
received a “decent burial within a reasonable time after the
crash of Flight 587.”106 Since the families had already voted for
the Trinity location, a “decent burial” consisted of complying
with their referendum.107
In response, OCME justified its decision to delay
disposing of the unidentified remains based on “continuous,
contentious and significant dissent among groups of next of
kin . . . .”108 Even so, OCME contended that it had no obligation
to seek input from the victims’ families. Under the Rules of the
City of New York, Title 24, subsection 205.01(d), OCME
conceded, it would normally be required to release human
remains to the next of kin.109 But in the case of unidentifiable
remains, there were no identifiable next of kin for purposes of
the statute.110 In this situation, OCME “maintains custody and
control over the remains” and, accordingly, “it is within the
discretion of OCME to dispose of the remains in an appropriate
manner to be determined by OCME.”111

102

See id.
See Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of the Application of Petitioner
Comite en Memoria del Vuelo 587 Inc. at 2, Hirsch, No. 100382/2005 [hereinafter Reply
Memorandum of Law] (emphasis omitted).
104
See id. at 2.
105
Hirsch, No. 100382/2005, slip op. at 1. New York Public Health Law
Section 4200(1) provides that “[e]xcept in the cases in which a right to dissect it is
expressly conferred by law, every body of a deceased person, within this state, shall be
decently buried or incinerated within a reasonable time after death.” N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW § 4200(1) (McKinney 2011).
106
Hirsch, No. 100382/2005, slip op. at 1 (emphasis omitted).
107
See Reply Memorandum of Law, supra note 103, at 2.
108
See Respondent’s Memorandum of Law in Support of the Verified Answer
at 3, Hirsch, No. 100382/2005.
109
Id. at 3-4.
110
Id. at 4.
111
Id.
103
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The court denied the petition and dismissed the suit on
multiple grounds.112 First, the court held that the Committee
lacked standing because it could not demonstrate that it was
“the appropriate entity to act as the representative of the
interests” of all the next of kin.113 The Committee’s Trinity
Cemetery proposal, ratified by a majority vote of the
representatives of only 100 victims, could not be said to
represent the majority will of the representatives of all 265
victims.114 Furthermore, the court found no “safeguards” in place
“to protect the interests” of the non-voting families.115 Any
decisions about the remains’ disposition, ruled the court,
required “direct participation” by the “appropriate” next of kin.116
The court also addressed the merits of the petition,
holding that the plaintiffs had failed to state a legally
cognizable claim.117 The court correctly noted, like in Shipley,
that the pertinent statutes “make it clear that, if there were no
further investigatory reason for [OCME] to retain remains of
an identified decedent, the [medical examiner] is obligated to
promptly release such remains . . . upon the demand of the
decedent’s next of kin.”118 But the court distinguished an
identified decedent from the remains in the case at bar:
[N]either of the parties has cited (nor has the court’s own research
revealed) any case, statute, rule or regulation which deals
specifically with a situation where human remains are unable to be
identified . . . . Under the current circumstances and apparently
without regulatory or statutory guidance, the OCME has established
a suitable procedure to obtain direction for the disposition of remains
from the victims’ next of kin as they become identified . . . .119

The “suitable procedure” that the court referred to was
OCME’s policy of providing a “Release Authorization” to any
families wishing to claim remains identified in the future.120 The
release “gave the next of kin the choice of claiming any remains
identified in the future or authorizing the OCME to dispose of
112

The court dismissed the proceeding on three separate grounds. First, the
Committee lacked standing. Hirsch, No. 100382/2005, slip op. at 2-3. Second, the
Committee failed to join all necessary parties. Finally, the Committee failed to state a
legal claim for relief. Id. at 2-4.
113
Id. at 2-3.
114
Id. at 3.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id. at 3-4.
120
Id. at 2.
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such remains as deemed appropriate by the OCME.”121 Under
such a procedure, the families were faced with the unenviable
choice between assigning away their rights to the remains and
waiting for piecemeal identifications conditioned upon advances
in DNA testing. Had the Committee vote represented a majority
of the 265 victims’ representatives here, under the court’s ruling
the vote still would not have been binding unless every legal
representative had participated. While the latter requirement
supposedly safeguards the interests of all the families, it
effectively precludes collective decisions over the disposition of
unidentified remains. Paradoxically, because the court reasoned
that “decisions to be made with respect to the interment of the
remains of a loved one are so highly personal,” none get to decide
unless all decide.122
In the Memorial case,123 OCME has likewise provided
release authorization forms to the victims’ next of kin. The
responses have varied: “Some families retrieve[d] new remains
right away, conducting small ceremonies and reopening graves to
bury them. Some [have] wait[ed] for years, and are still waiting,
in order to collect them all at once. Families of about 150 victims
have asked not to be notified at all.”124 Unless relatives inform
OCME that they do not wish to be notified temporarily or
permanently, they “will continue to receive calls for as long as
[OCME], aided by advancing technology, makes identifications.”125
Two years after Hirsch was decided, the New York City
Council amended Section 557,126 subdivision (f),127 thus granting
OCME the authority to “perform the functions of the city
mortuary . . . including the removal, transportation and
disposal of unclaimed or unidentified human remains . . . .”128
The legislative record reveals that the amendments were
viewed as mere housekeeping measures updating the New
York City Charter to reflect responsibilities that OCME had

121

Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 3.
123
See supra note 33.
124
McGinty, supra note 10, at A1.
125
Id.
126
See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
127
NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., LOCAL LAW NO. 53 (2007), available at
http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=447342&GUID=7EB32EF259DF-401E-889B-D8B96EBDBD1D&Options=ID%7cText%7c&Search=medical+examiner
(follow “Local Law” hyperlink under “Attachments”) (last visited Oct. 30, 2012).
128
Id. The current Charter contains the exact same language. See N.Y.C.
CHARTER § 557(f)(2) (Supp. I 2011).
122
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already been performing.129 In other words, the Council rubberstamped the proposed language without considering, or even
contemplating, its scope or consequences.130
As the preceding analysis demonstrates, unidentified
remains exist in a legal limbo. Until a fragment is identified, the
families have no right to determine its disposition and OCME
has no legal duty to release it. And under the black letter law,
OCME may dispose of unidentified remains even where the next
of kin wish to claim them.131 If the dissenting families end up
litigating the WTC remains, the courts would have to determine
whether Section 557 precludes the next of kin from claiming
unidentified remains in OCME’s possession. Sparse case law
exists interpreting Section 557, but in a prior case concerning
WTC remains, the court suggested that the next of kin have no
proprietary interest in unidentified remains, and thus no legal
authority to determine the manner of disposal.132

129

See Transcript of the Minutes of the Committee on Health at 3, Council of
the City of New York (Oct. 11, 2007) [hereinafter Health Committee Transcript],
available at http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=447342&GUID=
7EB32EF2-59DF-401E-889B-D8B96EBDBD1D&Options=ID%7cText%7c&Search=
medical+examiner (statement of Joel Rivera, Chairman, Comm. on Health) (“This
legislation would update the law to reflect changes in technology and increase
responsibilities that [OCME] has taken on over time.”); Press Release, Office of
Communications, Council of the City of New York, Updating Responsibilities of Office
of
the
Chief
Medical
Examiner
(Oct.
17,
2007),
available
at
http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=447342&GUID=7EB32EF259DF-401E-889B-D8B96EBDBD1D&Options=ID%7cText%7c&Search=medical+examiner
(“The Council is also voting on legislation to amend the City Charter to reflect new
responsibilities of the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (OCME). Due to
restructuring and advances in technology OCME has taken on new duties that are not
reflected in the Charter, such as performing the functions of City mortuaries, and
conducting DNA and other forensic testing. These will now be codified as formal
responsibilities of OCME.”).
130
The only testimony the Committee on Health heard was from a single
OMCE representative, who read from a prepared statement. See Health Committee
Transcript, supra note 129, at 5-8. The only mention of unidentified remains in the
statement was a description of how OCME was responsible for “transporting and
storing the remains of unidentified people and unclaimed people. Id. at 6-7. After the
testimony, Committee chairperson opined, “I think this is just a common sense process
that we’re going through right now.” Id. at 9. He then opened the floor to the other
committee members, who asked no questions. See id.
131
N.Y.C. CHARTER § 557(f)(3).
132
See WTC Families for a Proper Burial, Inc. v. City of New York, 567 F.
Supp. 2d 529, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, 359 F. App’x 177 (2d Cir. 2009).
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The Precursor Case to the Memorial Litigation: WTC
Families for a Proper Burial, Inc. v. City of New York
Finds No Property Interest in Intangible and
Unidentifiable Human Remains

On September 12, 2001, the City began relocating the
WTC debris to Fresh Kills, the inveterate garbage dump located
in Staten Island, so that federal and local officials could begin
the colossal task of scrutinizing the wreckage for evidence and
human remains.133 The initial, ad-hoc process for prospecting
remains by rake and shovel evolved over ten months to
increasingly sophisticated screening mechanisms whereby
480,000 tons of commingled organic and inorganic materials
were sifted through screens less than one-quarter inch thick.134
The miniscule pieces passing through these screens, referred to
as “fines,” included cremated remains of WTC victims.135
Families of the victims earnestly believed that City
officials had promised to segregate the fines containing human
remains from the residual waste stored at the landfill, in order
to accord dignity to the memory of the victims and ensure that
the remains would ultimately receive a proper burial.136 In
September 2004, however, several family members visited
Fresh Kills and discovered that sanitation employees had been
commingling the fines with household garbage and consigning
the mixture underneath a layer of earth.137 After failing to
convince the City to remedy the purported wrong,138 some of the
families established a nonprofit corporation139 in order to
effectuate a proper burial site for the fines. The corporation
subsequently filed a lawsuit140 in federal district court to compel

133

WTC Families, 567 F. Supp. 2d at 532; Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 28-30,
WTC Families, 567 F. Supp. 2d 529 (No. 05CV7243).
134
Amended Complaint, supra note 133, ¶¶ 31-40.
135
Id. ¶¶ 42-46.
136
Id. ¶¶ 47-49; WTC Families, 567 F. Supp. 2d at 533.
137
Amended Complaint, supra note 133, ¶¶ 51-53; WTC Families, 567 F.
Supp. 2d at 534.
138
Amended Complaint, supra note 133, ¶¶ 55-63.
139
World Trade Center Families for a Proper Burial, Inc. was incorporated in
2003 and professed to act on behalf of nearly 1000 families whose loved ones perished
at the WTC. See WTC Families, 567 F. Supp. 2d at 533 (noting that the nonprofit was
incorporated “with the stated purposes of representing the bereaved families,
retrieving the remains of 9/11 victims located at Fresh Kills, and providing a proper
burial and resting place for the remains”); Amended Complaint, supra note 133, ¶¶ 5-6.
140
The Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act of 2001 grants
the United States Court for the Southern District of New York “original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all actions brought for any claim (including any claim for loss of
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the City to reclaim the cremated fines, remove them from Fresh
Kills, and establish a cemetery for their final resting place.141
In WTC Families for a Proper Burial, Inc. v. City of New
York, the plaintiff families claimed that the City violated the
Due Process Clause (DPC) of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42
U.S.C. § 1983, and New York State law “by depriving [them] of
their rights over the remains of their deceased relatives,
including their right to provide a proper and decent burial for
their deceased family members.”142 Plaintiffs argued that their
quasi-property rights to the victims’ remains were entitled to
DPC protection under federal law. Neither federal nor state
law, according to plaintiffs, distinguished cremated remains
from an intact body.143 Accordingly, the families retained a
proprietary right to the “body parts, bone fragments, small
tissue particles and cremated remains” at Fresh Kills.144 Having
assumed responsibility for the recovery effort, the City “owed
[the families] a duty of reasonable care to insure that such
recovery effort was properly done.”145
The City moved to dismiss the suit, contending that the
DPC did not impose “an obligation to search and sift the WTC
material in any particular manner.”146 In its briefs, the City
argued that while no Second Circuit or New York State court
had yet considered whether the quasi-property right in the
deceased’s remains rises to the level of a DPC-protected property
interest,147 the case at bar should nevertheless be dismissed
because plaintiffs could not demonstrate that identifiable
remains were present at the landfill.148 In other words, the family
property, personal injury, or death) resulting from or relating to the terrorist-related
aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001.” Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (2001).
141
WTC Families, 567 F. Supp. 2d at 532; see also Anemona Hartocollis,
Landfill Has 9/11 Remains, Medical Examiner Wrote, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2007, at B3
(describing how “family members are trying to force the city to separate many
thousands of tons of debris that they believe still includes body parts and other human
remains from the landfill, and to create a formal burial place for them”).
142
Amended Complaint, supra note 133, ¶¶ 68-95. Plaintiffs also alleged a
cause of action, inapposite for purposes of this note, for violation of their right to free
exercise of religion because the City purportedly prevented the families from burying
their loved ones according to their religious tenets. See id. ¶¶ 81-84.
143
Id. ¶ 3.
144
Id.
145
Id. ¶ 8.
146
Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss
the Amended Complaint or in the Alternative for Partial Summary Judgment, at 3,
WTC Families, 567 F. Supp. 2d 529 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 05CV7243) [hereinafter
Defendants’ Memorandum of Law].
147
See infra Part III.
148
Defendants’ Memorandum of Law, supra note 146, at 28-29.
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members, at most, could only prove that “the remains of some
undifferentiated and unspecified victims of the WTC disaster”
may have been commingled with the debris at Fresh Kills.149
Mindful of the families’ irreparable emotional anguish,
the court nevertheless held that plaintiffs had failed to state a
legally cognizable claim and dismissed the suit.150 The court
recognized that New York common law grants the next of kin
the right to possess, and determine the final disposition of, a
decedent’s remains.151 The court, however, qualified that right
as constituting something less than “a property right in the
ordinary sense of the term . . . .”152 Rather, it “extends only as
far as necessary to entitle the next of kin to protection from
violation or invasion of the place of burial, and to protect the
next of kin’s right to ensure a proper burial.”153
Moreover, the court found the quasi-property right
operative only in cases where the next of kin claim possession
over “identifiable, recoverable bodies . . . .”154 Neither the
plaintiffs nor the court itself could find a case which extended
“such a right to an undifferentiated mass of dirt that may or
may not contain undetectable traces of human remains not
identifiable to any particular human being.”155 Accordingly, the
court concluded that “[w]ithout something tangible or
identifiable, there is no property right.”156 And without a
property right, the DPC claim must fail:
[T]his case concerns a total and complete absence of identifiable
remains of any identifiable person. And just as that crucial fact was
fatal to plaintiffs’ Constitutional claims, it is fatal as well to
plaintiffs’ state law claims . . . . [W]ithout identified remains of an
identifiable deceased, there is no person, or part of a person, and
there can be no right, to bury . . . . [P]laintiffs have no property right
in an undifferentiated, unidentifiable mass of dirt that may or may
not contain the remains of plaintiffs’ loved ones.157

149

Id. at 29.
WTC Families, 567 F. Supp. 2d at 534.
Id. at 537 (citing Colavito v. N.Y. Donor Network, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 2d
237, 243 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)).
152
WTC Families, 567 F. Supp. 2d at 537.
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
Id. (emphasis added) (citing Comite en Memoria del Vuelo 587 Inc. v.
Hirsch, No. 100382/2005, slip op. at 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 26, 2005)).
157
Id. at 541-42.
150
151
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WTC Families cited Hirsch for the proposition that
there can be no property interest in unidentifiable remains.158
As precedent for that assertion, Hirsch is dubious at best. The
Hirsch court merely concluded that no case law, statute, or
regulation directly deals with a situation where OCME
possesses yet-to-be-identified remains.159 The Memorial case
presents an opportunity for the New York courts to reconsider
whether Hirsch and WTC Families remain good law.
The facts of the Memorial case are distinguishable from
WTC Families in one major respect. There is no doubt that
OCME possesses WTC victims’ remains, whereas in WTC
Families, the court made a factual determination that “all
human remains that could be identified, were identified. Only
dust remains.”160 That is, the WTC Families court rested its
decision partly on the fact that there was no concrete proof that
the fines contained human remains at all. No such ambiguity
exists in the Memorial case.
Thus, the courts may have the opportunity to decide
whether the quasi-property right embraces tangible and
potentially-but-not-currently-identifiable
human
remains.
While the courts can easily avoid settling this issue on any
number of technicalities,161 this note argues that the courts, and
ultimately the legislature, should directly confront this issue.
III.

THE QUASI-PROPERTY RIGHT IN CORPSES

If the dissenting families are to succeed in challenging
the City’s plan to transfer the unidentified remains to the
Memorial repository, they must establish a legal basis for their
authority to determine the final disposition of the remains held
by OCME. That necessarily entails proving that the next of kin
have a quasi-property right to the remains. Within the quasiproperty right:
[T]he law has recognized in the kin having the duty of burial a right
to possession of the body so that the duty can be carried out. This is
a right to receive possession of the body immediately and in the
same condition it was in at the time of death. There is also a
correlative duty imposed upon anyone who may have the possession
158

Id. at 537.
Hirsch, No. 100382/2005, slip op. at 3.
160
WTC Families, 567 F. Supp. 2d at 532.
161
See Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 480 (6th Cir. 1991) (describing
how courts “confronted with determining the nature of the [quasi-property] right have
avoided characterizing it” as property and settled suits on other grounds).
159
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not to mutilate the body and to deliver possession. The right to
possession of the body exists only in order to aid the accomplishment
of the duty of burial and, therefore, should only be co-extensive with
that duty.162

While a surviving spouse or relative may not have the
same property interest in a dead body as he or she would in a
house or automobile, he or she does have a proprietary right to
exclusive possession of a corpse for the purpose of burial.163 In
the proceeding sections, this note will survey the origin and
scope of the modern quasi-property right to determine whether
it embraces unidentified human remains.
A.

What Is Property?

The meaning of the quasi-property interest in a dead
body lacks consistency.164 According to one recent commentator,
“The right to burial is an academic subject which could
encompass several volumes . . . .”165 Proprietary rights to
corpses are nonexistent in some jurisdictions but are expansive
in others.166 Courts have held body parts to be both protected
and unprotected as a property of sorts under the Due Process
Clause.167 To understand what it means to have a quasiproperty right in a dead body, it is necessary to contrast the
right from general conceptions of property.
Under the prevailing scholarly view,168 property is
viewed as a metaphorical bundle of rights, with each stick or
twig in the bundle representing a right relative to the world at
162

B. Joan Krauskopf, The Law of Dead Bodies: Impeding Medical Progress,
19 OHIO ST. L.J. 455, 458 (1958) (citing Finley v. Atl. Transp. Co., 220 N.Y. 249 (1917)).
163
Melissa A.W. Stickney, Note, Property Interests in Cadaverous Organs:
Changes to Ohio Anatomical Gift Law and the Erosion of Family Rights, 17 J.L. &
HEALTH 37, 43 (2002).
164
See Elizabeth E. Appel Blue, Redefining Stewardship over Body Parts, 21
J.L. & HEALTH 75, 105-06 (2008) (noting that “currently, there is no consensus in the
courts over how to treat bodies . . . [and] the law of the body remains in a state of
confusion and chaos” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
165
Tomkins, supra note 36, at 94.
166
See Appel Blue, supra note 164, at 106 (finding that “American
jurisdictions are today divided between the ‘no property’ jurisdictions and the ‘quasiproperty’ jurisdictions, with each side claiming a majority”).
167
For cases finding a Due Process Clause entitlement in a dead body, see
Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1991), and Newman v.
Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786 (9th Cir. 2002). For cases rejecting due process
claims, see Fuller v. Marx, 724 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1984), and Lawyer v. Kernodle, 721
F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1983).
168
See Stickney, supra note 163, at 42 (describing how property “has been broadly
defined as consisting of a bundle of rights, an analogy the Supreme Court has employed a
number of times” (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979))).
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large.169 “Property,” therefore, has a legal meaning distinct from
its pedestrian connotation, and “has been described as an
aggregation of a person’s legally protected expectations in
regard to a [thing].”170 The right to a thing, commonly labeled
an entitlement, is traditionally dichotomized as either a
property right or personal right.171 The former defines an
“entitlement to a certain thing (proprietary rights in rem) and
the law protects this entitlement against the world as a
whole.”172 The latter defines an “entitlement which is
enforceable against a specific person or a specific class of
persons (rights in personam), such as those which result from
obligations like liability in tort or contractual entitlements.”173
The right to something in rem is stronger than an in personam
right because it protects the “property” of the “owner” from a
larger, indefinite class of persons.174
Legal niceties aside, property simply can be understood
as rights that the government guarantees and enforces through
the courts.175 Some of the most prominent rights include “the
rights of possession, exclusion, use, and disposition, the right to
enjoy fruits or profits, and the right of destruction.”176 For courts
to recognize a property interest, “the party must have a
sufficient number of the ‘twigs’ in the property bundle, though
not the complete bundle. There is, however, no bright-line test
for determining the threshold amount of ‘twigs’ necessary to
establish a property interest.”177 But does the quasi-property
right contain enough of these twigs for the WTC families to
“own” the unidentified remains?

169

See, e.g., NILS HOPPE, BIOEQUITY—PROPERTY AND THE HUMAN BODY 49 (2009).
Michael H. Scarmon, Brotherton v. Cleveland: Property Rights in the Human
Body—Are the Goods Oft Interred with Their Bones?, 37 S.D. L. REV. 429, 429 (1991).
171
See HOPPE, supra note 169, at 70.
172
Id.
173
Id.
174
See generally THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, THE OXFORD
INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: PROPERTY 9 (2010) (“Because the [in rem] right attaches
to the object, rather than to particular people, it is universally binding on all who
encounter the object.”).
175
See Roy Hardiman, Toward the Right of Commerciality: Recognizing Property
Rights in the Commercial Value of Human Tissue, 34 UCLA L. REV. 207, 215 (1986).
176
Erik S. Jaffe, Note, “She’s Got Bette Davis[’s] Eyes”: Assessing the
Nonconsensual Removal of Cadaver Organs Under the Takings and Due Process
Clauses, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 528, 549 (1990).
177
Stickney, supra note 163, at 43.
170
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Historical Origin of the American Quasi-Property Right

English common law, inherited by the American colonies,
did not recognize a human corpse as property.178 Instead, a dead
body was considered “nullius in bonis,” the property of no one.179
Authority over human remains belonged to ecclesiastical courts,
which “monopolized the judicial power over the subject of
burial . . . .”180 As a result of this jurisdictional peculiarity, family
members had “no property interest in the body or ashes of an
ancestor,” and thus no legal remedy “for disturbance of a
corpse.”181 This led to an absurd result, whereby surviving next of
kin could sue for things like defacing the headstone but not for
exhuming the body from the grave.182
When the United States severed political ties with its
colonial master, the states jettisoned ecclesiastical jurisdiction.183
As a consequence, states were free to develop autonomous
property rules concerning corpses.184 Most repudiated the
perceived injustices of the English system,185 first by granting
jurisdiction over dead bodies in courts of law.186 Ensuing familial
disputes led courts to reconsider whether someone could validly
claim that a dead body was his property. Empowered with
jurisdiction, several courts began to modify the no-property-in-acorpse rule.187

178

See Larson v. Chase, 50 N.W. 238, 238-39 (Minn. 1891).
See id. at 239 (citing Lord Coke, Third Part of the Institutes of the Law of
England, 3 CO. INST. 203 (1797)).
180
R.P. Taylor, Right of Sepulture, 53 AM. L. REV. 359, 359-60 (1919); see also
Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 56 A. 878 (Pa. 1904); Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery,
10 R.I. 227, 238 (1872); Ritter v. Couch, 76 S.E. 428 (W. Va. 1912); Denay L. Wilding
Knope, Comment, Over My Dead Body: How the Albrecht Decisions Complicate the
Constitutional Dilemma of Due Process & the Dead, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 169, 176 (2009).
181
Wilding Knope, supra note 180, at 175-76.
182
See id.; cf. In re Widening of Beekman St., 4 Brad. Sur. 503, 519-20 (N.Y. 1857).
183
See, e.g., REMIGIUS N. NWABUEZE, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE CHALLENGE
OF PROPERTY 46 (2007); Tanya K. Hernández, The Property of Death, 60 U. PITT. L.
REV. 971, 993 (1999); Knope, supra note 180, at 175-76.
184
See Stickney, supra note 163, at 41.
185
See Wilding Knope, supra note 180, at 176 (describing how American
courts, “[l]acking ecclesiastic influence and disliking the potential injustice that the noproperty system created . . . , devised a way around the rule, and . . . assumed
jurisdiction over dead bodies” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); cf.
Pettigrew, 56 A. at 879; Pierce, 10 R.I. at 235-39; Ritter, 76 S.E. at 430.
186
Larson v. Chase, 50 N.W. 238, 238 (Minn. 1891).
187
Id. One court went as far as holding that “the bodies of the dead belong to
the surviving relations . . . as property, and that they have the right to dispose of them
as such, within restrictions analogous to those by which the disposition of other
property may be regulated.” Bogert v. City of Indianapolis, 13 Ind. 134, 138 (1859)
(emphasis added).
179
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[S]ome American courts [started] to recognize a right to possession of
a body for burial, which they recognized as a property right of sorts.
Eventually, recognizing that property might not be the best
description of the right to a corpse for burial, some courts in the
United States articulated a hybrid term they called quasi-property
which gave families and friends a right to claim a corpse to effect a
burial, but not for any other reason . . . .188

The judiciary, however, did not stray far from the
English no-property rule; almost no early American courts
seemed willing to view a corpse as property “in the common
commercial sense of that term.”189 Instead, the courts came up
with the concept of “quasi-property,” which gave the next of kin
the right to “possession of a dead body for the purposes of
decent burial.”190
C.

The Quasi-Property Right Is an In Rem Property Interest

The quasi-property right was not created in a vacuum.
It is not a static concept but has evolved in response to
“changed conditions of society” and scientific advances.191 The
first incarnation, from the mid- to late-nineteenth century,
arose from exhumations and internecine familial disputes over
the burial locus.192 Ecclesiastical jurisdiction having been
discarded, the courts placed a duty upon the next of kin to
ensure that decedents were properly and timely buried. The
courts, therefore, conferred a corresponding legal right upon
the survivors in order to reinforce this obligation and protect
188

Appel Blue, supra note 164, at 106.
Larson, 50 N.W. at 239-40.
190
Id. at 238-39 (holding that a widow “had the legal right to the custody of
[her husband’s] body for the purposes of preservation, preparation, and burial” and
could maintain a cause of action for the defendant’s unlawful dissection of the
husband’s cadaver); see also Pierce, 10 R.I. at 242 (holding that although “the body is
not property in the usually recognized sense of the word, [it may be considered] as a
sort of quasi property, to which certain persons may have rights”); but see Bogert, 13
Ind. at 138 (holding that dead bodies belong to the next of kin “as property”).
191
Foley v. Phelps, 37 N.Y.S. 471, 473 (App. Div. 1896) (noting “the obdurate
common-law rule has been very much relaxed, and changed conditions of society, and
the necessity for enforcing that protection which is due to the dead, have induced
courts to re-examine the grounds upon which the common-law rule reposed, and have
led to modifications of its stringency”); see also Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477,
481 (6th Cir. 1991) (explaining that “[t]he importance of establishing rights in a dead
body has been, and will continue to be, magnified by scientific advancements”).
192
See, e.g., Bogert, 13 Ind. at 135 (concerning illegal interment of a dead body
in a municipal cemetery); In re Donn, 14 N.Y.S. 189, 190-91 (Sup. Ct. 1891); Wynkoop
v. Wynkoop, 42 Pa. 293, 293 (1862) (adjudicating an appeal challenging injunction
barring appellant from relocating decedent’s remains to another cemetery); Pierce, 10
R.I. at 228, 243.
189
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the repose of the dead.193 Absent a legal right and remedy, the
criminal law punished the intermeddler and the civil law taxed
the vandal, but the survivor would be powerless to reinter the
body.194 Thus, in In re Donn,195 the court explained that unless
the next of kin received the right to possess and control “the
body of their deceased relative, it might be left unprotected:
and in case a corpse should be found in the possession of one
who had invaded the grave and disinterred it, they would be
powerless to reclaim it.”196 The courts could adhere to the noproperty rule because a corpse had no pecuniary value at that
time.197 There was simply no other path for a dead body to take
other than directly to the cemetery. Consequently, the courts
saw no calamitous ramifications to labeling a body as a
property of sorts, because it easily settled internecine disputes
among families as to who should control death.198 The courts
granted an in rem interest which they enforced through
equitable remedies like injunctions.199
The late-nineteenth century, however, saw an
“outpouring” of New York cases litigating rights to cadavers as
a result of modern conditions and scientific innovation.200 First,
the transformation of kinship and “loosened family ties” led to
contests over control of the decedent’s remains, often between a
man’s widow and his children.201 Second, cremation gradually
became a preferred alternative to interment and the next of kin
brought suits against the deceased’s testator challenging such
a disposition of the body.202 Finally, the demand for human
cadavers for medical research led enterprising individuals to

193

See In re Donn, 14 N.Y.S. at 190.
See In re Widening of Beekman St., 4 Brad. Sur. 503, 522, 530 (N.Y. 1857).
195
In re Donn, 14 N.Y.S. at 189.
196
Id. at 190.
197
In re Beekman St., 4 Brad. Sur. at 529 (“[M]uch of the apparent difficulty of
this subject arises from a false and needless assumption, in holding that nothing is
property that has not a pecuniary value. The real question is not of the disposable,
marketable value of a corpse, or its remains, as an article of traffic, but it is of the
sacred and inherent right to its custody, in order to decently bury it, and secure its
undisturbed repose.”).
198
See, e.g., Weld v. Walker, 130 Mass. 422 (1881); Wynkoop v. Wynkoop, 42
Pa. 293 (1862); Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227 (1872);
Secord v. Secor, 18 Abb. N. Cas. 78 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1870).
199
See, e.g., Weld, 130 Mass. at 423; Wynkoop, 42 Pa. at 302-03 (reversing
lower court’s injunction ordering removal of the deceased’s body); Pierce, 10 R.I. at 24243; Secord, 18 Abb. N. Cas. at 78, 81.
200
In re Johnson’s Estate, 7 N.Y.S.2d 81, 85 (Sur. Ct. 1938).
201
Id.; see also Secord, 18 Abb. N. Cas. at 78.
202
In re Johnson’s Estate, 7 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
194

2012]

“ONLY DUST REMAINS?”

257

engage in the lucrative trade of body snatching.203 In response
to the cadaver trade, states enacted “anatomy laws” permitting
medical institutions to dissect certain unclaimed bodies, thus
mollifying the stringent “common law right to immediate burial
intact” and relieving the public duty to effectuate a decent
burial for all deceased persons.204 As “cases involving
unauthorized mutilations” continued to increase, “courts began
to recognize an exclusive right of the next of kin to possess and
control the disposition of the bodies of their dead relatives, the
violation of which was actionable at law.”205
In this context, the seminal case of Larson v. Chase
delineated the quasi-property right quite broadly.206 There, a
widow brought a civil action for emotional distress resulting
from the defendant’s illegal dissection of her husband’s body,
alleging interference with her exclusive right to control the
body.207 The defendant argued that the suit failed to state a
claim, since a dead body is not property and mental damages
could not be sustained without a showing of “actual tangible
injury to person or property.”208 The court reasoned that a
person’s right to possession of a corpse “leads necessarily to the
conclusion that it is his property in the broadest and most
general sense of that term, viz., something over which the law
accords him exclusive control.”209 Therefore, despite the fact
that the widow could not claim damages for pecuniary loss
resulting from the dissection itself, the court permitted
compensation for mental suffering because it was a “direct,
proximate, and natural result” of an interference with the
widow’s exclusive right to possession.210
Likewise, in Foley v. Phelps, the New York Appellate
Division held that a widow could maintain a civil cause of
action for the unauthorized dissection of her husband’s body.211
The court wrote that “changed conditions of society, and the
necessity for enforcing that protection which is due to the dead”
requires New York courts to reconsider the “obdurate” common

203

See Nelkin & Andrews, supra note 38, at 263; Wilding Knope, supra note
180, at 177-78.
204
Krauskopf, supra note 162, at 459-60; Nelkin & Andrews, supra note 38, at 263.
205
Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2002).
206
Larson v. Chase, 50 N.W. 238, 239-40 (Minn. 1891).
207
Id. at 238.
208
Id.
209
Id. at 239 (emphasis added).
210
Id. at 239-40.
211
Foley v. Phelps, 37 N.Y.S. 471, 474 (App. Div. 1896).
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law rule that there was no property interest in a dead body.212
While the court stopped short of grounding its decision in a full
property right, it wrote:
Irrespective of any claim of property, the right which inhered in the
plaintiff, as . . . [the] nearest relative, was a right to the possession of
the body for the purpose of burying it . . . . That right of possession is
a clear legal right . . . . The right is to the possession of the corpse in
the same condition it was in when death supervened . . . . If this
right exists, as we think it clearly does, the invasion or violation of it
furnishes a ground for civil action for damages. It is not a mere idle
utterance, but a substantial legal principle, that wherever a real
right is violated a real remedy is afforded by the law.213

Though the widow had a clear legal right to possess the
body, there did not appear to be a remedy. Under the common
law, someone who had a right to immediate possession of an
item could seek redress of any number of theories, including
replevin214 and conversion.215 But since the quasi-property right
was something less than full property, these remedies were
inapplicable. Instead of finding an in rem right in the next of
kin, the court ostensibly found an in personam right sounding
in tort law, allowing the widow to recover damages from the
defendant for “mental suffering.”216 It is understandable that
the court would come out this way. Besides the moral
implications of labeling a body as property, it would be almost
impossible for the courts to calculate damages for illegal
dissections or autopsies since bodies had no readily identifiable
value. If the widow here could not collect damages for
emotional injury, she would, in effect, have no real remedy for
violation of her right to possess her husband’s body.
Larson and Foley are among the first in a long line of
decisions upholding damages for what has come to be known as
intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), based on an

212

Id. at 473.
Id. at 473-74.
214
See 23 N.Y. JUR. 2D Conversion § 90 (2011) (summarizing that an action in
replevin “is to provide a lawful remedy for one who is lawfully entitled to the
possession of a chattel that is in the custody of another and who cannot simply take
possession if, in so doing, a breach of the public peace will ensue”).
215
See Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 8 N.Y.3d 43, 49-50 (2006)
(“A conversion takes place when someone, intentionally and without authority,
assumes or exercises control over personal property belonging to someone else,
interfering with that person’s right of possession.” (citation omitted)).
216
Foley, 37 N.Y.S. at 474 (analogizing the quasi-property right to the right to
vote as “merely a personal right”).
213
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underlying quasi-property right to dead bodies.217 The quasiproperty right subsequently sounded predominantly in tort
law, as opposed to actions like replevin or conversion for
interference with a possessory right.218 As such, the policy
undergirding the quasi-property right came to be understood as
merely protecting the emotional sensibilities of the decedent’s
family.219 Accordingly, this right has garnered considerable
criticism. One commentator notes that this “dubious ‘property
right’ . . . cannot be conveyed, can be used only for the one
purpose of burial, and not only has no pecuniary value but is a
source of liability for funeral expenses.”220 Another critic
contends that the purported property interest is a “legal fiction
to fashion a remedy” for sympathetic plaintiffs.221
Contrary to the scholarly criticism, the availability of
emotional damages actually demonstrates how robust the
quasi-property right is and the extent to which courts “have
been jealous to protect and enforce” it.222 IIED damages became
predominant in quasi-property suits not because the right is
spurious or merely a “convenient hook upon which liability is
hung,”223 but rather because the “property” at issue was a dead
body. For moral and practical reasons, a corpse had no legal

217

See, e.g., Darcy v. Presbyterian Hosp., 95 N.E. 695, 696 (N.Y. 1911)
(concluding that Larson “fully meets [the New York Court of Appeals’] approval”);
Foley, 37 N.Y.S. at 474; Wilding Knope, supra note 180, at 177 (describing how the
quasi-property right came to embrace “the right to refuse an autopsy, the right to
prevent the removal of body parts, and the right to recover damages for any outrage,
indignity, or injury to the body of the deceased” (quoting Philippe Ducor, The Legal
Status of Human Materials, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 195, 229 (1996))).
218
Cf. Michelle Bourianoff Bray, Personalizing Personalty: Toward a Property
Right in Human Bodies, 69 TEX. L. REV. 209, 228 (1990) (arguing that “American
courts have evolved from protecting the family’s interest in the corpse through property
law to contending that there is no property in a corpse and instead protecting the
family’s interest through tort law, a position functionally similar to that taken by
English courts”).
219
See Hernández, supra note 183, at 991-94.
220
Id. at 994 (quoting WILLIAM PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 44 (2d ed. 1955)).
221
NWABUEZE, supra note 183, at 59 (“The concept of quasi-property is an
ingenious invention by the US courts to help a deserving plaintiff. It is a legal fiction. It
has no relationship with property in the ordinary sense of that word. The concept of
quasi-property is a judicial contrivance that provides a legal basis for judicial remedy.
It does not mean that a plaintiff has property interest in a corpse in the traditional
sense of property right.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Ga. Lions Eye Bank, Inc. v.
Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127, 128 (Ga. 1985) (“It seems reasonably obvious that such
property is something evolved out of thin air to meet the occasion, and that in reality
the personal feelings of the survivors are being protected, under a fiction likely to
deceive no one but a lawyer.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
222
Danahy v. Kellogg, 126 N.Y.S. 444, 448 (Sup. Ct. 1910).
223
Carney v. Knollwood Cemetery Ass’n, 514 N.E.2d 430, 434 (Ohio App.
1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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market value.224 Accordingly, the courts were incapable of
quantifying damages in the usual manner for violations like
illegal dissections. In the quasi-property context, therefore,
IIED constituted a surrogate theory whereby the courts
supplanted more traditional claims for interference with a
possessory right.
As noted earlier, from the earliest inception of the
quasi-property right in the American common law, courts
adhered to the rule that “there is no right of property in a dead
body.”225 The next of kin had an exclusive right to possess the
body, but only for a singular purpose: burial. As a result, the
right occupied an anomalous position between an in rem and an
in personam entitlement.226 This was possibly a curious
consequence of the common law system. As one scholar seems to
suggest, “Whereas the civil law defines property as the aggregate
of these expectations, the common law focuses on the separate
legal interests. Under the common law, there is no requirement
that an interest satisfy all of these expectations before it qualifies
as property.”227 In other words, because American courts only
needed to focus on the right to possession in contests over burial
of dead bodies, they could happily ignore the inconsistency
between granting a right to exclude while simultaneously
proclaiming that dead bodies were not property.228
Several authors have argued that via the quasi-property
right, the next of kin hold “the most essential sticks in the
bundle,” including the right to immediate possession, to
determine disposition, and to seek redress.229 Although some
224

See NWABUEZE, supra note 183, at 59.
Danahy, 126 N.Y.S. at 447.
226
Compare Larson v. Chase, 50 N.W. 238, 239 (Minn. 1891) (finding that the
right to immediate possession for burial is “property in the broadest and most general
sense of that term, viz., something over which the law accords [to the next of kin]
exclusive control”), with Foley v. Phelps, 37 N.Y.S. 471, 474 (App. Div. 1896)
(analogizing the right to possession of a corpse with the right to vote, which “can in no
sense be called a pure right of property . . . [but] is merely a personal right”).
227
Hardiman, supra note 175, at 218-19.
228
See Wilding Knope, supra note 180, at 176 (describing how American
courts “circumvented the no-property rule by declaring that a decedent’s relatives did
have an interest in the body for burial and interment purposes”).
229
Mary L. Clark, Keep Your Hands Off My (Dead) Body: A Critique of the
Ways in Which the State Disrupts the Personhood Interests of the Deceased and His or
Her Kin in Disposing of the Dead and Assigning Identity in Death, 58 RUTGERS L. REV.
45, 89 (2005); cf. Jaffe, supra note 176, at 553; but see Brian Morris, Note, You’ve Got to
be Kidneying Me!: The Fatal Problem of Severing Rights and Remedies from the Body of
Organ Donation Law, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 543, 547 (2009) (arguing that the quasiproperty right constitutes “nothing more than a right and corresponding duty to bury
or dispose of a body”).
225
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twigs are missing, most notably the right to sell or commercially
exploit a dead body, the quasi-property right “include[s] more
twigs than some interests which have received protection.”230
Therefore, quasi-property should be considered an in rem
entitlement and afforded the strongest legal protections.
D.

The New York Quasi-Property Right

Whichever court has jurisdiction to entertain a lawsuit
over the WTC victims’ remains,231 substantive New York law
will govern whether the families of those WTC victims have a
right to claim the unidentified remains.232 As the following
subsections illustrate, under existing case law, the quasiproperty right also attaches to body parts, cremated remains,
and even the identified remains of WTC victims.
1. The Quasi-Property Right Applies to Constituent
Parts of Dead Bodies
In Shipley,233 the court had to decide whether the
plaintiffs could validly claim a quasi-property right to their
son’s excised brain.234 After OCME completed its autopsy, it
released the body to the plaintiffs without informing them that
the brain had been removed and stored in the examiner’s
office.235 The plaintiffs discovered what happened after they had
already buried the body.236
The court held that OCME violated the plaintiffs’ quasiproperty right to exclusive and complete possession of their
son’s body.237 Shipley therefore stands for the proposition that
the quasi-property right embraces claims to constituent body
parts removed from a corpse. The WTC victims’ unidentified
230

Jaffe, supra note 176, at 553.
The Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act of 2001 grants
S.D.N.Y. “original and exclusive jurisdiction over all actions brought for any claim
(including any claim for loss of property, personal injury, or death) resulting from or
relating to the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001.” Pub. L. No.
107-42, 115 Stat. 230, 241 (2001).
232
See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978)
(explaining that “the underlying substantive interest is created by an independent
source such as state law” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
233
See supra Part II.A.
234
Shipley v. City of New York, 908 N.Y.S.2d 425, 427 (App. Div. 2010).
235
Id.
236
Id. at 427-28.
237
Id. at 427, 430-32. See supra notes 85-94 and accompanying text for a
review of the court’s analysis.
231
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remains are likewise components separated from a human
body. But are fragmented pieces of bone and tissue analogous
to an intact organ like a brain? Shipley moves a step in the
right direction to support quasi-property claims to the WTC
remains but requires further support.
2. The Quasi-Property Right Applies to Cremated
Remains
In the few New York cases where plaintiffs claimed a
right to their relatives’ cremated remains, they succeeded.238
For instance, in Schmidt v. Schmidt, the court held that a
widow was entitled to her husband’s ashes pursuant to her
quasi-property right.239 The court directed her brother-in-law—
who had possession of the ashes—to return the remains and
awarded damages for emotional distress.240
Booth v. Huff also involved a suit over the right to
dispose of cremated human remains.241 After the decedent’s
wife, who was seeking a divorce at the time of her husband’s
death, scattered his ashes in the Hudson River, his daughters
sought damages for mental distress.242 They claimed to be the
decedent’s lawful next of kin and that defendant interfered
with their quasi-property right to bury the remains by
“refusing to turn over the remains and disposing of them
without notifying plaintiffs.”243 Although the immediate issue
confronting the appellate court involved procedural questions,
the court assumed that the quasi-property right inhered to the
decedent’s cremated remains so that it did not have to
determine who was legally entitled to them.244
3. The Quasi-Property Right Applies to the Identified
Partial Remains of the WTC Victims
One New York court has already ruled that quasiproperty rights attach to the identified remains of a WTC
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victim.245 Caseres v. Ferrer concerned the right to receive partial
remains of Michael Trinidad, who died in the towers on 9/11.246
Partial remains of his body were recovered and identified by
OCME through DNA testing.247 Trinidad’s sister had petitioned
the lower court for an order releasing the remains from OCME
for burial.248 Meanwhile, the decedent’s ex-wife also claimed his
remains.249
The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s ruling
that the remains should be released to the decedent’s sister.250
Because the decedent died intestate, “the only people who have
standing to seek possession of the remains for preservation and
burial are his surviving next of kin.”251 Therefore, the ex-wife
had no standing.252 Under the Rules of the City of New York,
Title 24, section 205.01,253 the sister “was the next of kin
qualified to receive his remains and to give instructions
regarding the burial.”254 Thus, once OCME has affirmatively
identified by DNA testing the partial remains of a WTC victim,
the quasi-property right attaches and the statutorily defined
next of kin are entitled to possession of the remains.
IV.

NEW YORK CITY SHOULD MODIFY SECTION 557 TO
REQUIRE MANDATORY CONSULTATION WITH THE NEXT
OF KIN CONCERNING THE DISPOSITION OF CLAIMED BUT
UNIDENTIFIED HUMAN REMAINS

As evidenced by Part II, the law governing the
disposition of unidentified human remains lacks clarity. While
Hirsch ruled that the next of kin could collectively determine
the remains’ disposition, provided that all directly participate
in the process,255 WTC Families concluded that unless remains
are identifiable, the next of kin have no proprietary interest in
them.256 Both cases stressed the lack of legislative or judicial
245
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guidance on the issue.257 Moreover, although the text of Section
557 literally grants OCME authority to dispose of unidentified
remains, the New York City Council rubber-stamped this
language without considering, or even contemplating, whether
that authority should apply in situations where unidentified
remains have been claimed by the next of kin.258 The dispute
over the Memorial repository reveals the dangers of this lack of
clarity and guidance.
A.

The Memorial Dispute Revisited

Both sides of the divide in the Memorial dispute agree
that the families should have the last word over how to
determine the final disposition of the WTC victims’ unidentified
remains. Advocates of the repository plan argue that this has, in
fact, already happened.259 The decision to return the remains to
the WTC site, according to Memorial director Alice M.
Greenwald, was “a direct result of an extensive consultative
process led by [LMDC] . . . .”260 In 2002, LMDC invited the
leaders of various 9/11 family advocacy groups to join its Family
Advisory Council (FAC). FAC ratified the “idea of a repository”
in the summer of 2002.261 Because LMDC selected
representatives from the family advocacy groups to speak for all
the families in a “republican manner,” a former member
maintains, FAC represented the majority will.262
In contrast, the gravamen of the Regenhard lawsuit is
that the families were not adequately consulted in decisions
concerning the WTC remains.263 The dissenting families contend
that they were not represented in the LMDC-led process.
Instead, the families propose that a “democratic” process
should prevail, in which a decision is fashioned in “consultation
257
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with all of the 2,753 families whose loved ones perished on
9/11.”264 To that end, they assert that the City should begin by
“writing a letter to all of the victims’ families on this issue,
holding a series of forums exclusively for them and inviting
them to take a principal role in the decision.”265 Any final
disposition, they argue, should represent the will of the
majority of families.266
Although these seventeen dissenting families may
ultimately represent the minority view with respect to the
repository plan, their lawsuit raises serious concerns about the
legality, and thus the legitimacy, of that process. Even
assuming that the outreach efforts undertaken by LMDC were
adequate and the repository plan did, in fact, represent what
most family members wanted,267 it is still unclear where LMDC
derived the authority to initiate and lead this process. LMDC is
a “joint State-City corporation” created after 9/11 to “help plan
and coordinate the rebuilding and revitalization of Lower
Manhattan,” including the Memorial.268 It is a subsidiary of
New York State Urban Development Corporation (doing
business as Empire State Development), the state’s “lead
economic development agency” whose mandate is to “provide
the highest level of assistance and service to businesses in
order to encourage economic investment and prosperity . . . .”269
Thus, a subsidiary of a corporate governmental agency charged
with assisting business development in Lower Manhattan
appointed members to a committee purportedly representing
all 2753 victims’ families; the families then ratified the
agency’s decision to relocate the remains to the Memorial, and
all the while the only on-the-books law mentioning anything
about unidentified remains unequivocally granted power to
remove, transport, or dispose of them to OCME.
It should not be surprising that, absent legislative
guidance, such extra-legal measures were taken. This dispute,
264
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therefore, should be seen as a clarion call to legislators to
clarify the law governing the disposition of human remains. In
the following section, this note suggests one possible solution to
the problem of unidentified human remains, borrowed from the
repatriation of Native American remains under the Native
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA).270
B.

An Apt Analogy: NAGPRA Mandates Consultation in
the Case of Culturally Unidentifiable Human Remains

As discussed earlier, the law as it currently exists
relegates unidentified remains to a state of legal limbo in
situations where next of kin claim commingled and
unidentified remains.271 This note recommends that, at a
minimum, the New York City Council revisit Section 557 to
consider whether it really intended to grant OCME such
blanket authority over unidentified human remains. The
Council would then have three choices. First, it could simply
decide that OCME should have absolute authority over
unidentified remains and may dispose of them at its discretion.
Second, the Council could modify Section 557 to require that
OCME retain possession of unidentified remains indefinitely
until advances in DNA testing allow for identification and
repatriation. Finally, it could amend Section 557 to provide a
mechanism by which the next of kin determine, to the fullest
extent practicable, the disposition of unidentified remains.
This note argues that the third option represents the
best possible outcome. Though DNA identification represents a
logical, bright-line threshold before the quasi-property right
will obtain, it seems unjust for a government agency—and not
the families—to determine the victims’ “final and most
enduring state.”272 Indeed, the establishment of the quasiproperty right—though it is inapplicable here—was as much
about the needs of the next of kin as it was about according
dignity to the decedent: it assists the survivors “in coming to
terms with the loss and their grief, particularly where the
death was unexpected.”273 Consequently, lawmakers should
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contemplate new standards and procedures for the disposition
of claimed but unidentifiable human remains. In devising this
new legal framework, the Council should look to the
repatriation of unidentified human remains under NAGPRA as
a paradigm.
Congress enacted NAGPRA274 in 1990 to “remedy
inadequacies in state law dealing with the protection of Native
American remains and cultural objects.”275 Among various
provisions, the statute and its accompanying regulations
establish rules and procedures requiring and administering the
return of culturally identifiable276 human remains possessed by
museums or federal agencies to the appropriate Native
American tribe.277 By passing this human-rights legislation,
Congress was “concerned with treating Indian remains with
dignity and allowing tribes possessory rights over human
remains . . . associated with their tribes.”278 Implicit in
NAGPRA is the idea that Native American descendants
possess quasi-property rights in their ancestors’ remains.279
Additionally, in circumstances where the cultural
affiliation of human remains cannot be positively determined
by the agency or museum, NAGPRA nevertheless mandates
their return if a claimant is able to demonstrate cultural
affiliation by a preponderance of the evidence.280 The standard
is not one of “scientific certainty”; rather, NAGPRA only
requires a “reasonable connection” based on the evidence
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proffered by a claimant.281 NAGPRA as initially promulgated,
however, left a glaring regulatory hole. It failed to address the
disposition of culturally unidentifiable human remains in cases
where a claimant was unable to meet the preponderance of the
evidence standard.282 In 2010, however, the U.S. Department of
the Interior added new regulations to “clarify NAGPRA’s
procedures in situations involving culturally unidentifiable
human remains.”283 Prior to these amendments, NAGPRA
permitted institutions to retain culturally unidentifiable
human remains indefinitely.284 Now, however, institutions are
required to take measures to repatriate these remains.
The crux of the new regulations lies in 43 C.F.R.
§ 10.11.285 First, subdivision (c) places an affirmative duty upon
any museum or federal agency that cannot prove a right of
possession286 to culturally unidentifiable human remains to offer
to return the remains to the appropriate tribe or organization, in
the order of priority delineated in the regulation.287 Second,
subdivision (b) triggers a duty on the part of these institutions to
“initiate consultation regarding the disposition of culturally
unidentifiable remains” with tribes from whose tribal or
aboriginal lands the remains had been recovered.288 Consultation
is required after an institution receives a repatriation claim and
before it offers to transfer control of the human remains.289 The
aim of consultation is for the institution “to develop a proposed
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disposition for culturally unidentifiable remains . . . that is
mutually agreeable to the parties . . . .”290
By incorporating these two concepts—mandatory
repatriation and consultation—into Section 557 in the case of
claimed but unidentified remains, the Council would
potentially resolve several issues highlighted by the Memorial
case. First, mandatory repatriation would switch the burden,
requiring OCME to demonstrate valid cause to retain the
remains, rather than requiring the next of kin to compel their
release. Thus, it would significantly diminish OCME’s ability to
withhold the remains indefinitely.291 Second, mandatory
consultation would provide a legal mechanism, heretofore
nonexistent, to facilitate collective decisions by the next of kin
about the remains’ final disposition. Admittedly, NAPGRA’s
standard—a disposition “mutually agreeable to the parties”—is
vague. But the Council could find any number of dispositions
sufficient. One possibility is that the majority will of the families
should prevail. Another is for OCME itself to formulate a
disposition based on discussions with the next of kin, subject to
court approval.292 Perhaps even the FAC’s “republican” model293
may be appropriate, which transitions nicely to the final point: a
procedure under the color of law in which all claimants are
entitled to consultation confers legitimacy upon the proposed final
disposition, whatever its form. According to one expert in the field
of repatriation of Native American remains, the “most important
stakeholders are the descendants and the best way to resolve
conflict is through open and respectful dialogue.”294 Indeed, the
dissenting WTC families have stated that they want only an
equal voice in the decision over the remains’ disposition.295 If the
repository plan received the approbation of a majority of families,
they would accept that judgment—but “decisions made by those
without authentic authority should not be binding.”296
290
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CONCLUSION
No one but the Creator knows whose remains are among these
remains and whose is not. Therefore, no one family or group of
families can lay claim to saying, “my son,” “my daughter,” “my
husband,” etc., is among the remains, and no one can have exclusive
say of what should happen with them. This is why these remains are
still in the custody of [OCME].297

This note set out to discover who is legally empowered to
control the disposition of claimed but yet-to-be-identified human
remains in the context of the legal battle over New York City’s
plan to transfer the WTC victims’ remains to the National
September 11 Memorial and Museum. Under the complex web of
existing New York laws, these remains float in a state of legal
limbo. While the quasi-property right to possession of a
decedent’s body is robust, strong enough even to entitle the next
of kin to an identified fragment of a WTC victim,298 the Memorial
case has circumscribed the boundary of that right: DNA
identification.299 So until OCME identifies the remains, the
victims’ families have no legal basis to control or dispose of
them. Meanwhile, pursuant to a hastily enacted amendment to
the New York City Charter, OCME may dispose of unidentified
remains even if the next of kin have submitted claims.300
Therefore, this note recommends that the New York
City Council reevaluate Section 557 in order to clarify the
ambiguities and deficiencies in the law governing unidentified
human remains. In doing so, the Council should devise a
means for the next of kin, rather than OCME or the City, to
determine the remains’ final disposition. These changes should
be modeled upon the mandatory repatriation and consultation
provisions in NAGPRA.
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